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Abstract
In contemporary literature, the fact that there is negative causation is the primary motivation for re-
jecting the physical connection view, and arguing for alternative accounts of causation. In this paper 
we insist that such a conclusion is too fast. We present two frameworks, which help the proponent 
of the physical connection view to resist the anti-connectionist conclusion.
 According to the first framework, there are positive causal claims, which co-refer with at 
least some negative causal claims. According to the second framework, negative causal claims are 
generated from mapping and comparing different scenarios, which can fully  be accounted for in 
purely  positive terms. Since the positive causal claims evoked by both frameworks pose no obvious 
difficulties for the physical connection view, these frameworks make it possible for the connection-
ists to accommodate negative causal claims into their theory. 
 Once these strategies are available, the connectionists become able to render all the argu-
ments starting from the observation that there are negative causal claims in our causal discourse in-
conclusive with regard to the viability of the physical connection view.
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Turning Negative Causation Back to Positive
‘[O]missions and so forth are not part of the real driving force of nature. Every  causal situation de-
velops as it does as a result of the presence of positive factors alone.’ (Armstrong, 1999, p. 177)
1. Introduction
Causation, much like intentionality, supports intrinsic and derived notions. It should be clear that 
texts owe their intentionality to the persons who use them—without such authors or readers, it is 
just paint on paper. Similarly, certain causal accounts, as we shall claim in this paper, derive their 
meaning from other causal accounts. 
The parallel between causal and intentional accounts goes even further. It  does not take an 
intentional realist to admit, as we did above, that the meaning of texts derives from humans. The 
point where the two main positions, that of the intentional realist and the interpretationist differ is 
what they think about the intentionality of humans, not of texts. Similarly, in causality, we will 
identify cases where a causal account derives from a more primary account. Nonetheless, our analy-
sis remains neutral about what the ultimate nature of causation might be, just as a reductive analysis 
of the intentionality of texts remains neutral about the ultimate nature of intentionality.
 Negative causation is often used in accounts that describe seemingly ordinary causal relations 
that most people accept and perceive as causal. Not pressing the stop button kills our enemy who 
has fallen into the meat grinder. If anything is causal, it would be absurd to deny the causal effect of 
not pressing in this example, and this judgement is reflected in the ordinary moral, legal, and now 
philosophical accounts of the situation. A person can get convicted for not pressing the button if she 
had the ability  to do so, and common sense coincides with contemporary  philosophical analysis on 
this issue.
 However, having the ability (and opportunity) is not all—in fact it is not sufficient. The per-
son also needs an understanding (i.e. knowledge) of how the system works. Not knowing how but-
tons and other controls operate, there can be no way to stop the grinder, and there is no issue of re-
sponsibility either: if you don’t already know what  can cause what in this scenario, all you can do is 
just to try things out in random (depicted as a funny series of erratic events in less heroic movies) or 
(at a higher degree of mechanical ignorance, such as in very  young age) just watch in horror. Not 
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pressing the (right) button under these latter circumstances does not constitute killing—as common 
sense and legal practice tells. How about philosophical analysis?
Our purpose in this paper is to reconstruct negative causation in a way that utilises the above 
common-sense logic in a more precise way, and reflects certain observations about generating 
negative causal claims. In contemporary literature, the fact that there is negative causation is the 
primary motivation for rejecting a certain kind of causal account, namely the physical connection 
view.1 Our fundamental aim in this paper is to show that once one recognises and respects the actual 
process of formulating negative causal claims, one becomes able to reconcile negative causation 
with the physical connection view.
2. What is at stake in the debate over negative causation?
Negative causation is the case where an absence plays the role of either the cause (omission: not-C 
causes E) or the effect (prevention: C causes not-E). Negative causation is undoubtedly  present in 
our everyday causal talk. People often make causal claims like: ‘I failed on the exam due to my  lack 
of knowledge’ meaning that not having the necessary  knowledge (not-C) caused one’s failing on an 
exam (E), or ‘we couldn’t finish the tennis match because it started to rain heavily’ meaning that  the 
downpour (C) caused not finishing the match (not-E). Negative causation also populates scientific 
theorising (the absence of vitamin-C causes scurvy, the absence of insulin causes diabetes, etc.), and 
features in legal judgements (the driver not paying attention to the road signs caused the accident).
 We have no intention to deny any of these observations. On the contrary, we acknowledge that 
negative causation legitimately  exists in causal talk. However, even if the presence of negative 
claims in causal discourse is admittedly  beyond dispute, there is little consensus about the status of 
negative causal claims.
 For example, Philip Dowe argues that negative causation, rather than being genuine, is only 
‘quasi’ causation (Dowe, 2000, 2001, 2004). Dowe starts his analysis by identifying two conflicting 
intuitions he claims we all share. On the one hand, we often have an intuition of difference when 
comparing cases of negative causation (e.g. that it is the father’s negligence—the absence of his at-
tention—what causes the son’s accident) and cases of genuine causation. On the other hand, in rela-
tion with certain cases of negative causation (e.g. chopping off the head causes death) we have 
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1 According to this account, the causal connection between the relata of causation is due to a physical connection such 
as, for example, energy flow. Versions of the physical connection view differ in what they think about the nature of this 
physical connection. Some claim that it consists in a transference of energy-momentum (Fair, 1979). Others argue that it 
is in fact a process, a continuous qualitative presence transmitting a mark (Salmon, 1984, 1994,  1998; Dowe, 2000). 
Still others characterise the physical connection in question as an intrinsic tie (Mackie, 1980).
strong intuitions of genuine causation. Next, Dowe provides his so-called counterfactual account 
which (as opposed to the strategy of the proponents of negative causation who typically build on the 
second intuition while neglecting the first one) is able to deal with both intuitions: it  respects the 
first and explains away the second. According to Dowe, negative causal claims are in fact counter-
factual claims about genuine causation—instead of expressing actual genuine causation they  ex-
press the mere possibility of genuine causation.
 Contrary  to this, Jonathan Schaffer argues that negative causation is indeed genuine causation 
(Schaffer, 2000, 2004). He draws attention to how strong the genuinist intuition is: negative causa-
tion is supported by all the central conceptual connotations of causation, it  features in paradigm 
cases of causation, it is required by the most useful theoretical applications of causation, and is rec-
ognised in scientific practise (cf. Schaffer, 2004, p. 203). Moreover, Schaffer argues that Dowe’s 
main motivation for thinking that negative causation is only quasi-causation, namely the intuition of 
difference, is in fact a misdescription of our intuition and implicitly assumes the physical connec-
tion view of causation.
 This latter point is especially problematic, since what is at  stake in this debate is whether cer-
tain accounts of causation are to be preferred over other accounts. That is, the problem of negative 
causation owes its importance to the consequences of its existence. As Schaffer puts it, negative 
causation refutes the program of the physical connection account. He says:
‘The physical connection view of causation may seem plausible if one concentrates on collid-
ing billiard balls, or other cases of connection. But negative causation reveals the view to be a 
hasty generalization.’ (Schaffer, 2004, p. 204) 
 Schaffer argues along the following line of thought. Given that  negative causation is genuine 
causation the physical connection view necessarily fails to provide a general account of causation 
since in the case of omissions and preventions causes and effects are not physically  connected: there 
can be no physical connection between the absence of something and the occurrence of something 
else.2
 Moreover, since there are theories of causation, which do just  fine in incorporating cases of 
negative causation, the conclusion that these theories are to be preferred over the physical connec-
tion account naturally arises. As Schaffer says:
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2 Dowe (2004), by claiming that negative causation is not genuine causation tries to reject this line of thought and de-
fend the physical connection account.
‘So the situation is that negative causation poses a problem for only some theories. What 
should one conclude from that? I would have thought that the logical conclusion would be 
that negative causation provides an argument in favor of the theories that can handle it.’ 
(Schaffer, 2004, p. 212)
 That is, negative causation is utilised as a motivation for criticising the physical connection 
account of causation and favouring others. Schaffer himself argues for the contrastive account 
(Schaffer, 2005), whereas, for example Carl Craver (2007)—on the very same grounds, i.e. building 
on the observation that there is negative causation—provides an argument for the interventionist 
(Woodward, 2003) account.
 To recap, consider the role negative causation plays in the argument against the physical con-
nection view. The claim is that  cases of negative causation cannot be accounted for in terms of 
physical connections. The debate over the failure of the physical connection view turns on whether 
negative causation is genuine causation or not. That is, the argument from negative causation to the 
failure of the physical connection view (AfNC) has the following structure:
 (AfNC) – Argument from Negative Causation
 (P1) There are negative causal claims (where either the cause or the effect (or both) is
  an absence) in causal discourse.
 (P2) Absences are not connected physically to either occurrences or other absences. 
 (P3) Negative causal claims express cases of genuine causation.
 (C) The physical connection view fails to provide a general account of genuine causation.
 In what follows, our paper is concerned with what possibilities a connectionist might have in 
order to render this argument inconclusive.3 We explore two different  frameworks which could help 
the connectionist to overcome the obstacle of negative causation. 
 The first framework is motivated by the observation that negative causal claims often seem to 
co-refer with certain positive causal claims. That  is, the first framework accepts that negative causal 
claims express genuine causation, but claims that  the relations negative causal claims pick out can 
also be picked out by positive causal claims, which pose no difficulty for the physical connection 
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3 Of course, one such possibility,  i.e. Dowe’s strategy, is already on the table. Here we are interested in what possibili-
ties remain for those, who accept Schaffer’s objections to Dowe’s counterfactual account.
account. If this is the case, then one cannot infer from negative causation to the conclusion that the 
physical connection view is unable to provide a general account of genuine causation.
 The second framework is motivated by  an observation about how negative causal claims are 
formulated. Within this framework, it  can be shown that negative causal claims in fact  do not ex-
press genuine causation. Rather, they are derived from mapping and comparing different scenarios 
such that whereas the different scenarios themselves involve genuine causal sequences the negative 
claim picks the cause and effect from different causal sequences. Since all scenarios involved can 
be described in terms of positive terminology posing no difficulty for the connectionist, within this 
framework the physical connection view is able to explain the idea of negative causal claims ex-
pressing genuine causation away, which in turn, by rejecting (P3) stops the anti-connectionist argu-
ment.
 In other words, both frameworks seem to offer a way for the connectionist to account for the 
relations picked out by negative causal claims solely in terms of physical connections. Once such a 
strategy is available for the connectionist, she becomes able to render all the arguments starting 
from the observation that there are negative causal claims in our causal discourse inconclusive with 
regard to the viability of the physical connection view.
3. Introducing the co-reference framework
Consider electron-holes and the void. Both are absences (electron-holes are absences of electrons, 
the void is the absence of everything), still both occur in causal claims as causes—they are classical 
examples of negative causation. However, on closer reflection they reveal something important 
which might give ammunition for those who try to reject the anti-connectionist argument.
 Take electron-holes first. Electron-holes are positively charged quasi-particles—literally they 
are absences of electrons on the valence band. Physics often makes causal claims about electron-
holes. The very fact that they  are treated as quasi-particles reflects this. The quasi-particle talk at-
tributes similar causal efficiency to electron-holes as ordinary particles possess, which makes them 
a clear case of negative causation (cf. Schaffer, 2004, pp. 202-203).
 Closer reflection reveals that the electron-hole term stands for a phenomenon where an elec-
tron (due to gaining enough energy) escapes its bond and moves from the valence band to the con-
duction band. The electron-hole talk credits certain properties to the absence of the electron and 
treats it  thereby as a quasi-particle. These properties, however, are in fact the properties of the band 
from which the electron escaped. That is, a positive description of the phenomenon reveals itself: a 
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band with such properties is causing what happens in scenarios usually described by the electron-
hole talk.
‘The hole is an alternate description of a band with one missing electron, and we either say 
that the hole has wavevector -ke or that  the band with one missing electron has total wavevec-
tor -ke.’ (Kittel, 2005, p. 194)
 That is, the term ‘electron-hole’ (the negative term referring to the absence of an electron) 
stands for a complex state of affairs which itself can be accounted for using only positive 
terminology.4  Since this positive description is a quite complicated one compared to the version 
employing the ‘electron-hole’ term, the negative term might be called a shorthand: it  stands for a 
phenomenon which, though could be described by  using positive terms only, this description would 
be a much more detailed (and complicated) one than what one can get by employing the negative 
term. That is, the negative terminology simplifies the story to be told.
 The same with the deadly void. David Lewis’ famous example shows how the void is able to 
kill by sucking the air from the lungs, boiling the blood, draining the warmth from the body and in-
flating enclosures in the body until they burst (cf. Lewis, 2004, p. 276).
 Just like in the case of electron-holes, closer reflection reveals that the negative causal claim 
‘the void kills’ is a shorthand for a much longer story (which involves only positive terminology) 
telling how the air departs from the lungs, the blood boils, the body freezes and bursts. For example, 
the air departs from the lungs because the molecules in the lung, due to their kinetic energy, collide 
with each other and with the inner surface of the lung, thus building up a certain amount of pres-
sure, which—unless one is placed into equal or bigger outside pressure—forces the mouth to open 
and lets the molecules escape. Similarly, the whole body bursts because the molecules inside exert a 
force, which expands the inner cavities until the tissues get damaged.
 What these observations point out is the following. It is possible to refer to the very same 
causal relation5 by two quite different causal claims—one using some negative terms and one using 
only positive terms. That is, there is a positive causal claim picking out the very  same phenomenon, 
which is picked out by  the negative causal claim. For example, the negative claim ‘electron-holes 
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4 Notice that the positive term for ‘the band with one missing electron’ is the actual number of electrons on the band 
(which is often denoted as N-1, thereby emphasising that there could be N electron on the band).
5 Here, and throughout the paper,  we use the term ‘causal relation’ as being neutral to what the correct account of causa-
tion might be.
attract negatively charged particles’ refers to the very same causal relation as the positive claim ‘a 
region with N-1 electrons attract negatively charged particles from a region with X electrons’6.
 Notice that whereas the negative causal claim seemingly impedes a physical connection ac-
count (for it is hard to see how there could be a physical connection between something not being 
there—e.g. a missing electron—and anything happening—e.g. the attraction of a negatively charged 
particle) the positive causal claim readily invites such an account. The N-1 electrons in region A 
together exert  a given amount of repulsive force on a negatively charged particle, which is also re-
pulsed by the X electrons in region B, and since the latter force is bigger then the former one, the 
negatively charged particle in question moves toward region A.
 These observations give rise to what we call the co-reference framework. This framework ac-
knowledges that at least some instances of negative causal claims are such that the causal relation 
picked out by them can also be picked out by  a positive causal claim. Since these positive causal 
claims do not pose any obvious problem for the physical connection view, the anti-connectionist 
needs to do more then just pointing out that there are negative causal claims in our causal discourse. 
That is, the co-reference framework draws attention to that for the argument from negative causa-
tion to the failure of the physical connection view to go through an extra premise needs to be in-
serted into the argument claiming that no positive causal claim picks out the causal relation picked 
out by  the negative causal claim in question. The anti-connectionist argument supplemented with 
this further premise looks like this:
 (AfNC)*
 (P1) There are negative causal claims (where either the cause or the effect (or both) is
  an absence) in causal discourse.
 (P2) Absences are not connected physically to either occurrences or other absences. 
 (P3) Negative causal claims express cases of genuine causation.
 (P4) No positive causal claim picks out the same causal relation picked out by a negative 
  causal claim.
 (C) The physical connection view fails to provide a general account of genuine causation.
 This new version of the anti-connectionist argument opens up a new possibility  for the con-
nectionist to stop the argument. She can deny (P4) by pointing out that there are cases where there 
are positive causal claims co-referring with the negative claims in question. If so, the connectionist 
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6 Where N-1 and X are the actual numbers of electrons, and, say, X is bigger than N-1.
argument might  proceed, then the anti-connectionist needs to show that there are cases where (P4) 
actually holds, for only those cases would suffice to drive the anti-connectionist argument home. 
That is, the burden of proof is on the anti-connectionist side.
4. The co-reference framework: pros and cons
At this point, it  might be tempting for the connectionist to say something like ‘what really does the 
causal job, then, is the band itself with N-1 electrons on it’. That is, to argue that negative causal 
claims are in fact just  re-descriptions of certain causal relations, which could otherwise be picked 
out more accurately by a positive description.
 Philip Dowe (2001) has something similar in mind. When motivating what he calls the intui-
tion of difference (that upon reflection we recognise certain instances of negative causation as being 
not genuine cases of causation) he argues that instead of what  the negative claim ‘the father caused 
the accident by failing to guard the child’ suggests, what clearly  was the cause of the accident was 
‘the child’s running onto the road’ (cf. Dowe, 2001, pp. 217-218).
 However, as Jonathan Schaffer (2004) drew attention to it, there are at least two problems 
with this logic. First, claiming that the positive descriptions reveal the ‘real’ causal connections 
whereas the negative descriptions don’t begs the question since it presupposes the priority of the 
physical connection view. Schaffer argues that what pumps one’s intuitions in this case is that one 
implicitly  assumes that the physical connection view is correct, which in turn disqualifies the fa-
ther’s negligence as a real cause. 
 Second, there is no such thing as ‘the’ cause; one can only talk about ‘a’ cause (given certain 
conditions). What is a cause depends on what condition is brought into the foreground while the 
others are kept in the background. In this sense, different conditions can all be partial causes. 
Schaffer argues that both the father’s negligence and the son’s running onto the road are partial 
causes (cf. Schaffer, 2004, p. 210). 
 Note, that the co-reference framework provides enough resources to answer both of these 
challenges. If negative causal claims co-refer with certain positive causal claims in a way that the 
negative claims shorten and simplify the story to be told then one does not need to rely on an im-
plicit assumption of the physical connection view in order to judge the positive descriptions as su-
perior. One can stay entirely neutral about whether the physical connection view is correct or not, 
still one’s intuitions would be pumped toward preferring the positive description by accuracy-
considerations. The fact that typical examples of negative causal talk deploying such negative terms 
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as electron-holes or the void simplify the situation (i.e. provide causal claims which are less com-
plicated than those deploying only positive terms) supports the argument that negative causal claims 
are just short—but less accurate—ways of picking out causal relations. By providing a shorthand, a 
negative causal claim makes it possible to grasp a certain causal relation even without  knowing 
much of the details about it. If so, then, as the argument goes, the co-referring positive causal claim 
provides a probably much more complicated but, on the other hand, more accurate way  of grasping 
the very same causal relation. That is, the argument that positive descriptions reveal the ‘real’ causal 
relation is supported in this sense of being more accurate.
 As of the second problem: note that Schaffer’s point that  both the cause as picked out by  the 
negative claim and the cause as picked out by  the positive claim are partial causes cannot be applied 
in the co-reference framework. Claiming that, for example, the presence of the void and the inner 
pressure higher than the outer pressure are both causes (partial causes) of the death is simply wrong. 
Since the negative description and the positive description both refer to the same causal relation it 
cannot be the case that the void is a partial cause along with the cause picked out by the ‘inner pres-
sure higher than the outer pressure’ description. Once the positive story  is told, there is no further 
role for the void—the void is nothing over and above than what  have already been picked out by the 
positive description.
 That is, it seems that within the co-reference framework there are reasons to give in to the 
temptation of seeing the positive causal claim as the one that picks out the real causal relation.7
 The connectionist is not done, however. For there is a way  for the anti-connectionist to retort. 
All the anti-connectionist needs to emphasise is that (P4) as in (AfNC)* is inaccurate. It is not 
enough just to have a positive causal claim co-referring with every negative causal claim—for the 
connectionist to be able to stop the argument from negative causation it is also necessary that  the 
positive causal claims in question are such that they  pose no problem for the physical connection 
view, i.e. can be accounted for in terms of physical connections. Inserting this requirement into 
(AfNC)* results in the following formulation:
 (AfNC)**
 (P1) There are negative causal claims (where either the cause or the effect (or both) is
  an absence) in causal discourse.
 (P2) Absences are not connected physically to either occurrences or other absences. 
10
7  Of course, again, only in the sense of being more accurate.  Since, according to the co-reference framework, the 
negative and the corresponding positive descriptions co-refer,  this framework does not support the further claim that 
negative causation is not genuine causation. For possible stronger conclusions, see Section 7.
 (P3) Negative causal claims express cases of genuine causation.
 (P4) No positive causal claim—which can be accounted for in terms of the physical
  connection view—picks out the same causal relation picked out by a negative causal 
  claim.
 (C) The physical connection view fails to provide a general account of genuine causation.
 Now, as a next step, all the anti-connectionist have to do is to come forth with one single ex-
ample, where even if there is a positive causal claim co-referring with the negative one, it  cannot be 
accounted for in terms of the physical connection view.8
 As it is actually  the case, there are quite good candidates for this purpose. Consider, for in-
stance, the classical example of the gardener and the plant. According to the negative causal claim, 
‘the gardener not watering the plant caused the plant’s death’. The anti-connectionist could argue 
here that even if a positive description was given, i.e. ‘the gardener napping caused the plant’s 
death’, the physical connection view would still fail, since there would be no physical connection 
between the gardener’s napping and the plant’s death.
 Of course, the situation is a bit more complicated. The connectionist could dig her heels in 
and object that the failure of seeing the physical connection in the positive story might be a result of 
a failure of picking out the correct  positive description co-referring with the negative one. That is, 
the positive description cited by the anti-connectionist might  not co-refer with the original negative 
claim. Just to give one illustration, the connectionist could point out that ‘the gardener not watering 
the plant’ description tells us something about the gardener, the water and the plant, whereas ‘the 
gardener napping’ description has nothing to say  about the water and the plant. That is, it seems that 
the two descriptions do not co-refer.
 However, even if the connectionist wants to maintain that once the correct co-referring posi-
tive description (the one that really  co-refers with the negative claim, and which might be rather 
complicated) is given the physical connection becomes obvious, this would not  much of a help in 
this situation. For in cases like the gardener and the plant whether it  is possible to give a positive 
causal claim, which is apt  for being accounted for in terms of physical connections, is not straight-
forward at all. On the face of it, such cases do pose a problem for the physical connection view. As 
a result, the burden of proof is, again, on the connectionist side.
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8 The anti-connectionist can even acknowledge that within the co-reference framework the positive causal claims pick 
out their referents more accurately, and thus are more real. In this case, the anti-connectionist could argue that the de-
bate over negative causation ultimately boils down to whether physical connectivity might be caught out in the positive 
stories lurking behind negative causal claims.
 That is, though the co-reference framework provides natural treatment for instances of 
negative causation like those involving electron-holes, it seems to be unable to offer a full charac-
terisation covering all cases.
5. Introducing the mapping framework
As it happens, relying on co-reference is not the only  option available for the connectionist to block 
the argument from negative causation. Another framework reveals itself if one concentrates on how 
negative causal claims get formulated.
 Consider, as a test case, John catching the billiard ball before it  reaches the pocket. One might 
feel tempted to say that ‘John’s catching the ball causes not scoring’. By saying this, one claims that 
catching the ball (C) causes not scoring (not-E), which makes it a clear example of prevention, i.e. 
of negative causation. But how could one know that if John had not caught the ball, the ball would 
have fallen into the pocket? True, in all those cases where John catches the ball, the ball ends up in 
John’s hand, therefore it does not fall into the pocket. However, neither bounces the ball back from 
the wall right next to the pocket (or occurs in the opposite corner of the table or in John’s mug, 
etc.)—one simply cannot know whether John’s catching the ball causes not scoring or, say, not 
missing the shot, without knowing what happens when John does not interfere.
 It seems that the claim ‘John’s catching the ball causes not scoring’ cannot be formulated 
solely  on the basis of observing John catching the ball. For one to conclude the negative claim 
(catching the ball causes not scoring), one needs to know that without John’s hand interfering, the 
ball would have fallen into the pocket—instead of e.g. popping out of space-time at one point and 
re-manifesting itself in John’s hand. That is, over and above the observational fact that John catches 
the ball, what one also needs to know is that without John’s action the ball’s journey would have 
ended up inside the pocket.
 Therefore, in order to be able to formulate the negative causal claim, one must map and com-
pare two scenarios. The first scenario consists of the cue ball hitting the red ball, the red ball rolling 
towards the pocket, and the red ball falling into the pocket. The second scenario involves the cue 
ball hitting the red ball, the red ball rolling towards the pocket, John catching the red ball, the red 
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ball being in John’s hand.9  It is only the act of mapping and comparing, which presents John’s 
catching the ball as the cause of the ball not being in the pocket (i.e. not scoring).
 In fact, it is only the act  of mapping and comparing these two scenarios, which brings John’s 
catching and the pocket together so that they can be parts of the same causal claim. Originally, they 
occur in distinct causal sequences. On the one hand, in that sequence where John catches the ball, 
the ball never gets to the vicinity  of the pocket, so the fact whether scoring or not scoring should 
have happened cannot be determined. On the other hand, when the ball falls into the pocket John’s 
hand never interferes, his catching never occurs.
 That is, the negative claim in question is such that it connects an event10 present in one of the 
scenarios (John catching the ball) with the negation of an event present in the other scenario (the 
ball not falling into the pocket, i.e. not scoring). The events connected by the negative causal claim, 
thus, are not part of a single causal sequence and, therefore, are not relata of a single causal relation. 
In other words, the negative causal claim ‘John’s catching the ball causes not scoring’ does not ex-
press a case of genuine causation.
 Moreover, the scenarios on the basis of which one is able to formulate the negative claim are 
grasped via positive descriptions. The two causal sequences (‘cue ball hitting the red ball, the red 
ball rolling towards the pocket, the red ball falling into the pocket’ and ‘cue ball hitting the red ball, 
the red ball rolling towards the pocket, John catching the red ball, the red ball being in John’s 
hand’) do not seem to involve absences at  all, and thus are apt for being picked out by positive 
causal claims. Neither are there palpable disconnections between the causes and the effects of these 
causal sequences as characterised by  positive claims, so accounting for them does not pose any ob-
vious problem for the physical connection view.
 This is the mapping framework. According to it, negative causal claims are derived, or gener-
ated from one’s knowledge of distinct scenarios via mapping and comparing, where the individual 
scenarios themselves can be characterised by  purely  positive terminology posing no apparent prob-
lem for the physical connection view. Therefore, the mapping framework allows the connectionist 
to stop the argument from negative causation: if negative causal claims do not pick out genuine 
13
9 Of course,  we usually formulate negative causal claims without actually observing both scenarios.  Rather, based on 
our previous knowledge of similar situations, we presuppose what would happen in the other scenario if it actually hap-
pened. Still, the negative claim itself is generated from two distinct scenarios. These scenarios consist in causal chains 
or sequences with causes and effects occurring one after another. Note that by relying on such causal sequences our 
argument does not beg the question against negative causation. We remain neutral about what can play the role of a 
cause or an event here. In this sense, an absence ‘occurring’ at one stage of a causal sequence would result in a case of 
negative causation.
10 One can replace ‘events’ here with one’s favourite candidate for being the relate of causation—we would like to re-
main neutral about what exactly the relata of causation are throughout the paper. 
causal relations but  occur only in causal discourse as a result of mapping and comparing positive 
causal claims referring to different scenarios, which themselves are compatible with the physical 
connection view, then the mere observation that there are negative causal claims in our causal talk 
does not entail the failure of the physical connection view.
6. Using mapping iteratively and together with co-reference
As the anti-connectionist might want to pinpoint, however, it is not immediately obvious that the 
mapping framework is able to account for all cases of negative causation in a way, which is helpful 
for the connectionist. Consider, for example, the case of the gardener and the plant, the very prob-
lem, which disqualified the co-reference framework as a general solution.
 On the face of it, the negative claim ‘the gardener not watering the plant causes the plant’s 
death’ is generated from the mapping and comparing of two scenarios, which might be best charac-
terised as consisting of the following causal sequences: (S1) the gardener not watering, plant dying; 
and (S2) the gardener watering, plant living. Similarly to the argument of the previous section, 
knowing that the plant dies when the gardener does not water it is insufficient for concluding the 
negative causal claim, since it might have been the case that the plant would have died even if the 
gardener had watered it. So one needs (S2) as well, which makes it a case covered by the mapping 
framework.
 However, the problem now is that one of the causal sequences, namely (S1), involves ab-
sences: the gardener not watering, and the plant dying, i.e. not living. In fact, these are the very 
same absences, which are connected by the original negative causal claim. Since they  occur in the 
same causal sequence, it  seems that contrary to what the mapping framework states, the negative 
causal claim generated do pick out a genuine causal relation. Moreover, (S1) does pose an obvious 
problem for the physical connection view, since not watering and not living seem to be physically 
disconnected. Therefore, as the anti-connectionist might want to argue, the mapping framework 
cannot help the connectionist to evade the conclusion of the argument from negative causation.
 Though the connectionist seems to be in trouble here, in fact she has two different answers 
ready  at her hands. She can either rely  on the mapping or on the co-reference framework in order to 
drive her point home. Relying on the mapping framework would mean drawing attention to that 
(S1) as formulated above strictly  speaking is not a scenario that one observes, but rather itself is 
generated from mapping and comparing concrete causal sequences, three in this case. So for exam-
ple, (S1) can be derived via mapping and comparing (S1a) where the gardener takes a nap and falls 
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asleep, (S1b) where the water is in the bottle and remains there, and (S1c) where the concentration 
of water becomes lower inside the plant and the plant withers. None of these three causal sequences 
involve absences or evoke obvious disconnections—that is, they  are apt for serving the connection-
ist’s purpose. 
 Similarly, the connectionist could rely on the co-reference framework and argue that the 
negative description of (S1) co-refers with, or to be more precise, is a shorthand for the disjunct of 
the positive claims describing (S1a), (S1b), (S1c). In this latter case, the original issue with the co-
reference framework (namely  that there is an obvious disconnection between the events picked out 
by the three positive claims) is not a problem anymore, since it is the mapping and comparing of 
(S1a), (S1b), (S1c) and (S2) which generates the negative claim, and thus a physical connection be-
tween the events occurring in the different sequences is not a requirement.
 Some might favour the mapping, others perhaps the co-reference framework here.11 In fact, it 
doesn’t really  matter whether one considers (S1a)-(S1c) as the mapping base of (S1) or as a dis-
junct, which co-refers with (S1); what does matter, is that  (S1a)-(S1c) and (S2) pose no obvious 
problem for the physical connection view and they together can serve as the basis of generating the 
negative causal claim ‘the gardener not watering the plant causes the plant’s death’.
 In short, we claim that by  using the mapping framework iteratively and together with the co-
reference framework it becomes possible for the connectionist to account for the occurrence of 
negative causal claims in causal discourse in terms of the resources provided by these frameworks 
and the physical connection view. In other words, no alternative account of causation is required to 
cover cases of negative causation.
 That is, the full answer the connectionist can give to the argument from negative causation is 
the following. For every negative causal claim either there is a single positive causal claim co-
referring with the negative claim, or the negative claim is generated from mapping and comparing 
different scenarios ultimately characterisable by positive causal claims. None of the positive claims 
in play here evoke obvious disconnections, i.e. unless evidence to the contrary is brought forward 
they  can be treated as compatible with the physical connection view. Thus, the mere fact that there 
are negative causal claims in causal discourse does not disqualify the physical connection view.
 On the basis of all this, the connectionist can argue that (AfNC)** is still not the most accu-
rate version of the argument from negative causation. The anti-connectionist argument, in order to 
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11  As we see it, rather than using either the mapping or the co-reference framework straightforwardly, one formulates 
(S1) by determining which are the relevant factors in the scenario consisting in the three causal sequences (S1a), (S1b) 
and (S1c) compared to the other scenario (S2). See Section 7 for more details about how relevance claims are generated 
via applying both the mapping and the co-reference frameworks together.
be able to reach its desired conclusion needs to exclude the applicability of the mapping framework 
as well. With this amendment the argument from negative causation has the following structure:
 (AfNC)***
 (P1) There are negative causal claims (where either the cause or the effect (or both) is
  an absence) in causal discourse.
 (P2) Absences are not connected physically to either occurrences or other absences. 
 (P3) Negative causal claims are not generated via mapping and comparing different
  scenarios, which themselves can be accounted for in terms of the physical connection 
  view, but rather express cases of genuine causation.
 (P4) No positive causal claim—which can be accounted for in terms of the physical 
  connection view—picks out the same causal relation picked out by a negative causal 
  claim.
 (C) The physical connection view fails to provide a general account of genuine causation.
 Given this analysis of the argument from negative causation to the conclusion that the physi-
cal connection view fails, the connectionist can stop the argument by claiming that though it is a 
valid argument, in fact it is unsound: (P3) and (P4) together are never true. If certain negative causal 
claims do express a case of genuine causation then there is always a co-referring positive causal 
claim picking out the same relation, and when there is no single positive claim co-referring with the 
original negative claim, then the negative claim is always derived from the mapping and comparing 
of further positive claims describing different scenarios. And since the positive claims in question 
pose no obvious difficulty for the physical connection view, its failure as a general account of genu-
ine causation does not follow from the observation that there are negative causal claims in causal 
discourse.
7. Derived causal notions
The major claim of this paper is that the negative causation based argument against the physical 
connection view is inconclusive. Besides this, however, a further important issue emerges from 
what has been said so far. As the mapping framework tells us, the notion of negative causation (at 
least in certain cases, i.e. when one considers the non-(P3) horn of the connectionist reply) is a de-
rived notion. That is, since negative causal claims are derived from the mapping and comparing of 
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positive claims, those who are subscribed to a particular causal account compatible with the positive 
claims in question, could argue that  from their account, given the mapping framework, the notion of 
negative causation can be derived. It is not only negative causation, though, which turns out to be 
derived in this sense. Other popular causal notions share the same fate.
 Consider relevance claims. In the case of the void, for example, even if one acknowledges 
that the negative claim ‘the void kills’ is a shorthand co-referring with the positive claim ‘inner 
pressure significantly higher than outer pressure kills’, one could still argue that the crucial factor 
here is the presence of the void. Inside pressure results in the air departing the lungs, the body  burst-
ing etc. only  if there is nothing outside, only if there is nothing that could exert a force to resist the 
inner pressure. The void kills by not exerting counter-pressure from the outside of the body. That is, 
one could argue that referring to the void reflects our intuitions better in picking out the cause, be-
cause it the presence of the void, which is the unexpected event, which is normally not the case. 
Bodies usually do not burst, because their inner pressure is compensated by atmospheric pressure. 
The fact that the inner pressure is uncompensated is the relevant factor which (when compared to 
normal cases) stands out as ‘abnormal’. That is, one might conclude, in causing the effect  in ques-
tion (death) what is relevant, is the lack of everything, i.e. the presence of the void.
 The mapping and co-reference frameworks can account for how such relevance claims are 
formulated. As the mapping framework draws attention to it, to be able to conclude on the relevance 
claim one needs to know two different scenarios: first that when a body is placed in the void the 
body dies, and second that when a body is placed under atmospheric pressure the body  lives. Know-
ing both of these scenarios is indispensable for formulating the relevance claim—without knowing 
the first, one wouldn’t know that being placed in the void and dying are somehow related; and 
without knowing the second, one couldn’t know that the body  would not have died if it had been 
placed under atmospheric pressure. Knowing both scenarios—and mapping and comparing them—
is what presents being placed in the void as the relevant cause of dying.
 On the face of it, the first scenario ‘when the body is placed in the void the body dies’ in-
volves absences. However, similarly to accounting for (S1) in Section 6, it is possible to account for 
this scenario in purely positive terms. For example, as the co-reference framework points out, the 
initial characterisation of the first scenario above (and similarly, that of the second one as well) is 
only a shorthand for a much more detailed and accurate description. 
 According to this more accurate description, in the scenario, which originally  is characterised 
as ‘where a body is placed under atmospheric pressure the body lives’, there are objects surround-
ing the body (say, air with atmospheric pressure) which exert  a force on the surface of the body  thus 
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resisting the inner pressure yielding an equilibrium state (body living). In the this case, the kinetic 
energy of the entities inside pushes the surface of the body outwards, whereas the kinetic energy of 
the entities outside pushes the surface inwards. The outer and the inner pressure—acting in tandem 
on the surface—result in an equilibrium state where the surface stands stable and inner processes 
can take place (body living).
 Similarly, in the scenario, which originally is characterised as ‘where the body is placed in the 
void the body dies’, there are no objects surrounding the body, thus no counter-pressure resists the 
inner pressure, which results in the bursting of the body (death). In this case, the kinetic energy of 
the entities inside pushes the surface outwards. The surface is constantly pushed outwards, the body 
bursts, and the inner processes break down (death).12
 The void (lack of entities outside) is not making its appearance in any of the two distinct sce-
narios. One is able to formulate the relevance claim (which is also a negative claim) only if one 
maps the two scenarios onto each other and compares them, thereby picking out the differences be-
tween the two scenarios. It is precisely the act of mapping and comparing these different scenarios 
what shows the presence of the void (i.e. that there is nothing outside of the body) as the relevant 
factor in causing death. That is, the relevance claim saying that it is the presence of the void what is 
relevant in killing is derived from the comparison of two positive stories: an ‘inner pressure – outer 
pressure – equilibrium’ story and an ‘inner pressure – expansion – more expansion – burst’ story. 
No absences are involved in either of the two scenarios compared; neither do they evoke physical 
disconnections. That is, again, the physical connection view is compatible with these positive causal 
claims. 
 Very  similarly, contrastive claims can also be seen as derivative. Consider, for example, the 
claim that  ‘being placed in the void rather than under atmospheric pressure causes the body to burst 
rather than to live’ (cf. Schaffer, 2005). It  is quite straightforward how the mapping framework pre-
sents such a claim as being derived from mapping and comparing the scenarios where the body is 
placed in the void and bursts, and where the body is placed under atmospheric pressure and lives. 
The same line of thought as above applies: one needs both scenarios in order to be able to conclude 
on the contrastive claim, and both scenarios can be characterised by  such positive causal claims, 
which pose no obvious problem for the physical connection view.
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12  Note that we do not argue here that one needs to know such details in order to be able to formulate the relevance 
claim. On the contrary, we acknowledge that one can easily conclude that ‘it is the presence of the void what is relevant 
in causing the death’ on the basis of a much more coarse-grained knowledge (cf. the original characterisation of the sce-
narios). All that is claimed here is that it is possible to give a more accurate description (a co-referring positive claim in 
this case) of the scenarios in question.
 That is, within the mapping framework, over and above negative causation, such notions as 
relevant factors and contrasts—which are fundamental notions of novel alternative accounts of cau-
sation (cf. Glennan (2010) and Schaffer (2005) respectively)—also turn out to be the results of 
mapping and comparing different scenarios. This, then, suggests that it is not just negative causation 
itself that is a derived or generated notion, but popular alternative accounts of causation (such as the 
contrastive account), and notions like causal relevance, themselves seem also to be derived simi-
larly.
 We do not have enough room here to further explore all the consequences of this conclusion, 
but one observation immediately follows. If contrastive causation and causal relevance are also de-
rived notions, then those being subscribed to an account of causation which is compatible with the 
positive claims from which these derived notions are generated from could argue that their account 
enjoys a certain sense of priority over those, which turn out to be derivative.
 For example, the connectionist could run the following argument: (i) the physical connection 
view is compatible with the positive claims in question; (ii) relevance and contrastive claims can be 
derived from the physical connection view given the mapping and co-reference frameworks; (iii) 
physical connection claims cannot be derived from the relevance-based or the contrastive accounts 
given the mapping and the co-reference frameworks; (iv) therefore, the physical connection view is 
more fundamental than the relevance-based and the contrastive accounts.13
8. Conclusion
The fundamental aim of this paper is to show that there is no straightforward route from recognising 
that negative causal claims populate our causal talk to the conclusion that the physical connection 
view fails. The paper aims to eliminate the point made by the opponents of the physical connection 
view, namely that the occurrence of negative causation counts in favour of an alternative view. Con-
trary  to this, the present paper argues that  negative causal claims can be accommodated by the con-
nectionist.
 The paper offers two strategies to show this. First, one can think of negative causation within 
the so-called co-reference framework where, for at  least some negative causal claims, it is possible 
to give co-referring positive descriptions which themselves pose no obvious problem for the physi-
cal connection account. If this is so, then those who want to argue against the physical connection 
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13 If the connectionist could provide a persuasive case for (iii) that would lend significant support for the strong conclu-
sion of (iv).
view from negative causation need to show at least that the examples they  rely on do not fall into 
this category.
 Second, the paper introduces the so-called mapping framework, according to which negative 
causal claims are generated from mapping and comparing distinct scenarios. Since these scenarios 
can in principle be accounted for in terms of the physical connection view, explaining negative cau-
sation—in the sense of explaining how negative causal claims get formulated—becomes possible 
for the proponents of the physical connection view.
 The co-reference and the mapping frameworks together cover all cases. Since the analysis of 
any arbitrary  case of negative causation within these frameworks seems to be compatible with the 
physical connection view, it is a safe bet to say that the co-reference and the mapping frameworks 
help the connectionist  to stop the argument from negative causation. At least, the burden of proof is 
on the anti-connectionist side.
 The mapping framework grasps an important fact about formulating negative causal claims, 
namely that one always needs to know two or more positive scenarios in order to be able to formu-
late a negative claim. On the other hand, the co-reference framework is not without virtues either. It 
grasps the fact quite well that some negative causal claims are often utilised as shorthands—they 
are regular players in e.g. scientific discourse even if the underlying positive scenarios are well 
known, simply  because they provide a short and simple way of putting what happens. In this sense, 
the mapping framework tells us how negative causal claims are formulated, whereas the co-
reference framework has something to say about why we often stick to using negative claims.
 The mapping framework has some further interesting consequences. First of all, it provides an 
easy answer to the problem of too many negative causes. Roughly, the problem is that if one ac-
knowledges that the gardener’s not watering the plant  is a cause of the plant’s death, then it is hard 
to see why e.g. the Queen’s (and therefore anybody’s) not watering the plant would not count as a 
cause of the plant’s death (cf. Beebee, 2004). The answer is given by the fundamental tenet of the 
mapping framework that negative causal claims are formulated on the basis of one’s actual knowl-
edge of two scenarios. That is, the mapping framework disqualifies all those persons’ not watering 
the plant  as good candidates for being a cause of the plant’s death who are not part of the actual 
scenarios from which the negative causal claim is generated. If one, for example, happens to be in a 
position that  one actually  sees the Queen watering a plant, then one would be able to map and com-
pare two scenarios, which would support that the Queen’s not watering can be a cause.
 Second, the mapping framework is able to incorporate Dowe’s counterfactual analysis of 
negative causation. What Dowe calls the possibility  of genuine causation is a causal relation in one 
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of the scenarios. Consider Dowe’s examples of prevention (‘the father’s grabbing the child pre-
vented the accident’) and omission (‘the father’s failure to grab the child caused the accident’). (Cf. 
Dowe, 2001, pp. 221-222) According to the mapping framework, both of these negative causal 
claims are formulated on the basis of mapping and comparing two scenarios: first, a ‘father grabs 
the child, the child walks with the father’ scenario and, a second scenario consisting in two parallel 
causal sequences, a ‘father being lost in thought, father wandering next to the road’ and a ‘child 
running over the road, accident happening’ sequence. The mapping framework points out that the 
prevention and the omission claims are generated via picking out different events from the two sce-
narios. The prevention claim seemingly connects the occurrence of an event belonging to the first 
scenario (father’s grabbing the child) with the absence of an event  belonging to the second scenario 
(accident not happening), whereas the omission claim seemingly connects the absence of the event 
belonging to the first scenario (the father’s failure to grab the child) with the occurrence of the event 
belonging to the second scenario (accident happening). These are two ways of grasping the differ-
ence between the same two scenarios mapped onto each other.14
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